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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
THE LINGERING DEBATE
The right to counsel' has a checkered history in American
jurisprudence. 2  Originating as merely the right to retain a
lawyer,3 it now assures a defendant legal assistance in all criminal
I The relevant portion of the sixth amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2 Historically, the right to counsel has differed in state and federal courts. In Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court created a constitutional right to counsel in state
trials under the rubric of procedural due process. In Powell, eight indigent and illiterate
black youths, unassisted by counsel until the morning of trial, were convicted of rape. The
Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that
in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is in-
capable adequately of making his own defense ... it is the duty of the court...
to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and
that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and
trial of the case.
Id. at 71. Sweeping dictum in Powell also provided a basis for extending the right into
noncapital cases where the defendants are neither illiterate nor uneducated. Id. at 69. In
subsequent cases, however, the Court limited Powell to its facts, specifically refusing to hold
that the assistance of counsel is a necessary component of a fair trial. See W. BEANEY, THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 164-88 (1955) (summarizing all fourteenth
amendment assistance of counsel claims that the Supreme Court heard between 1942 and
1950). Finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), the Court departed
from its procedural due process methodology, applying the sixth amendment guarantee
directly to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
For federal trials, the Supreme Court first defined the right to counsel in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Relying on Powell, the Court stated that the "Sixth Amend-
ment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and authority
to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives assistance of counsel." Id.
at 463. The Court expanded this interpretation in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76
(1942), by guaranteeing a defendant's right to effective assistance undiminished by conflicts
of interests resulting from joint representation.
After Gideon, the scope of the assistance of counsel clause became identical in federal
and state courts. It now applies equally to felony and misdemeanor offenses. (Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972)) and guarantees legal assistance at each "critical stage of
the prosecution." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). Under the "criti-
cal stage" rule, the government must provide counsel during arraignments (Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (decided on fourteenth amendment grounds)), interroga-
tions (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488, 492 (1964)), preliminary hearings (Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970)), and pretrial line-ups (Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37).
' W. BEANEY, supra note 2, at 29. Beaney argues that the Framers of the Constitution
intended merely to guarantee the accused the right to hire counsel for his defense. Thus,
for criminal proceedings, the assistance of counsel clause constitutionalized the Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73 (1789), which provided that "in all the courts of the
United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the
assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said court .. " Beaney
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proceedings that result in a prison sentence.4 Implicitly, the sixth
amendment also guarantees a right to effective assistance,5 but the
Supreme Court has never fully defined the scope of this right.
6
emphasizes the limited scope of the right to counsel in the American colonies, and sees the
lack of debate that accompanied this constitutional provision as evidence that the states
intended to retain the narrow meaning. W. BEANEY, supra note 2, at 14-26. Furthermore,
notes that Congress statutorily defined a special right to counsel for capital cases in the Act
of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). Although this act preceded ratification of
the sixth amendment by seven months, Beaney writes, "[i]t is logical to conclude that Con-
gress passed the act because the Sixth Amendment was irrelevant, in its view, to the subject
of appointment of counsel.. " W. BEANEY, supra note 2, at 28.
4 "We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed coun-
sel in his defense." Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). Scott clarified Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), which held "that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Id. at 37. Scott refused to extend
the right to counsel to cases where no actual imprisonment results.
5 "It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). The Su-
preme Court first considered the effectiveness of counsel in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932). See note 2 supra. Subsequent opinions have continued to examine the effective-
ness of counsel as a requirement of due process and the sixth amendment itself. See, e.g.,
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (sixth amendment guarantee denied when
joint representation ineffective); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955) (effective assist-
ance of counsel "a constitutional requirement of due process"); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (effective assistance of counsel "guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment"); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (guarantee of assistance of counsel not
not satisfied "by mere formal appointment").
6 The Supreme Court has defined ineffectiveness in some limited situations. See, e.g.,
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (joint representation of conflicting interests);
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (instructions denying defendant the right to
consult with counsel during trial recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (stat-
ute dispensing with summation arguments in nonjury trial). Significantly, the Court has
never defined effective assistance of counsel as it pertains to standards of attorney
performance. This provoked a strong dissent from Justice White in Maryland v. Marzullo,
435 U.S. 1011 (1978) (dissenting from denial of certiorari):
Despite the clear significance of this question, the Federal Courts of Ap-
peals are in disarray....
.I]t is this Court's responsibility to determine what level of competence
satisfies the constitutional imperative. It also follows that we should attempt to
eliminate disparities in the minimum quality of representation required to be
provided to indigent defendants. In refusing to review a case which so clearly
frames an issue that has divided the Courts of Appeals, the Court shirks its
responsibility as the court of last resort, particularly its function in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice under a Constitution such as ours.
Id. at 1011-13. The Court's unwillingness to address this issue is particularly ironic in light
of Chief Justice Burger's often quoted criticism of the bar, that "from one-third to one-half
of the lawyers who appear in the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully
adequate representation." Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 234
(1973).
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Without firm guidance, the circuits have experimented with
numerous definitions of "effective aid," 7 and a consensus has fi-
nally emerged. Nearly every federal court now equates effective
assistance of counsel with competent representation.8
A conflict lingers over whether an accused must prove prej-
udice to support an ineffective assistance claim. Some courts hold
that proof of attorney incompetence does not by itself dem-
For examples of the different definitions, see Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540,
547 (4th Cir. 1977), (within "the range of competence expected of attorneys in criminal
cases") cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th
Cir.), ("customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform
under similar circumstances") cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1976); Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970) ("the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which
normally prevails at the time and place"); United States v. Reincki, 383 F.2d 129, 132 (2d
Cir. 1967) ("so 'horribly inept' as to amount to 'a breach of his legal duty faithfully to
represent his client's interests' ") (quoting Kennedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883, 886 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 994 (1959)); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17
(D.C. Cir. 1967) ("gross incompetence ... that ... has in effect blotted out the essence of a
substantial defense"); Hickock v. Crouse, 334 F.2d 95, 100-01 (10th Cir. 1964), ("good-faith
representation, with all the skill which counsel possesses"); cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965)
Edgerton v. North Carolina, 315 F.2d 676, 678 (4th Cir. 1963) ("not afforded in any sub-
stantial sense professional advice and guidance"); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599
(1960), ("counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance")
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949)
(representation "such as to make the trial a farce and a mockery of justice") cert. denied, 338
U.S. 950 (1950). See also Stone, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Post-Conviction in Criminal
Cases: Changing Standards and Practical Consequences, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 427
(1975). See generally Brody, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction, 13
COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 1 (1977); Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due
Process, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1175 (1970); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. Rav. 289 (1964).
6 Originally, courts treated effective assistance of counsel as an ordinary due process
guarantee. See note 2 supra. For this reason, most circuits would reverse a conviction only if
the representation was "such as to make the trial a farce and a mockery of justice." United
States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950). In the
last 13 years, however, 10 circuits have abandoned the "farce and mockery" test. Dyer v.
Crisp, No. 78-1772 (10th Cir. Jan. 11, 1980); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113
(1st Cir. 1978); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011
(1978); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Williams
v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975); Beasley v. United
States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974);
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc); Bruce v. United States, 379
F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Except for the Seventh Circuit, which requires a "minimum
standard of professional representation," Twomey, 510 F.2d at 641, these courts all apply a
competence standard to measure effective aid. Furthermore, the Second Circuit has indi-
cated that it may consider switching to a competence standard at an appropriate opportun-
ity. Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1976).
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onstrate ineffectiveness. These judges, the incorporationists,9 will
only reverse a conviction if the accused proves that the alleged
deficiencies harmed him.10 The nonincorporationists, however,
determine ineffectiveness by focusing solely on the adequacy of
the attorney's performance."I For these judges, the impact of the
alleged incompetence is relevant only if they apply a harmless
error analysis.'
2
9 This Note uses "incorporation" as shorthand for a requirement that the accused
prove prejudice as an element of an ineffective assistance claim. The reader should not
confuse this usage with the standard meaning of "incorporation" in fourteenth amendment
analysis.
10 See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir., July 10, 1979) (en banc),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979); United States v. Ritch, 583 F.2d 1179, 1183 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Beran v. United States, 580 F.2d 324, 327 (8th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979); United States ex reL Johnson v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169,
177 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 425, 590
P.2d 859, 866 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739, (1979).
11 See United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979) (concurring
opinion, Robinson, J.) (dissenting opinion, Bazelon, J.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1334 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (concurring and dis-
senting opinion, Hufstedler, J.) ("[d]efendants who have been denied their Sixth Amend-
ment right to the assistance of reasonably competent counsel at trial should be entitled to
relief without a showing of prejudice"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Moore v. United
States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc) ("[tihis standard also makes it clear that
the ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's act or omis-
sion, but whether counsel's performance was at the level of normal competency"); Coles v.
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.) ("[a]n omission or failure to abide by these require-
ments constitutes a denial of effective representation of counsel unless the state, on which
is cast the burden of proof once a violation of these precepts is shown, can establish lack of
prejudice thereby"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). See also Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (implicitly presuming prejudice in holding harmless error
analysis inapplicable).
Some courts have adopted a flexible approach, deciding on a case-by-case basis
whether to require a showing of prejudice. See, e.g., Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214, 1223
(5th Cir. 1979) ("the facts of each case must be examined; in each case we must assess the
advisability of requiring a showing of prejudice"); Thomas v. Wyick, 535 F.2d 407, 414
(8th Cir.) ("generally imposing the burden of demonstrating unfairness on the petitioner,"
but "[i]f the particular circumstances of the case require a different allocation of the bur-
den, that allocation will be adopted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976); United States ex. reL
Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970) (requiring petitioner to prove prej-
udice when "failure of counsel [is] with respect to a narrow issue," but applying automatic
reversal when counsel's deficiencies "have ... so pervasive an effect on the process of guilt
determination that it is impossible to determine accurately the presence or absence of prej-
udice").
" For an explanation of harmless error, see note 69 infra. Nonincorporationists differ
over the propriety of using harmless error in an ineffective assistance of counsel case.
Compare United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Coles v.
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968) (permitting government to prove harmless error)
with Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1334-42 (9th Cir. 1978) (concurring and dissent-
ing opinion, Hufstedler, J.) (arguing harmless error inapplicable), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974
(1979).
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This Note analyzes these conflicting approaches by examining
the relationship between the "effective aid" guarantee and the
underlying constitutional right to counsel, and concludes that an
accused should not have to prove prejudice. The Note dem-
onstrates, however, that harmless error analysis is appropriate for
certain ineffectiveness cases, and it proposes a method for iden-
tifying such claims.
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
A. United States v. Decoster: Framing the Dispute
United States v. Decoster 13 provides a useful framework for
examining the conflict between incorporationist and nonincor-
porationist methodologies. On its facts, Decoster typifies many inef-
fective assistance of counsel cases. Willie Decoster was convicted of
aiding and abetting an armed robbery and an assault with a
dangerous weapon. 14 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court rejected the basis of the appeal,15 but raised sua sponte the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 16 It remanded the rec-
'3 No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979).
See generally, Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel:
A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REv. 752 (1980).
'4 United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1973) affd, No. 72-1283
(D.C. Cir., July 10, 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979). The appellate court
vacated the conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon because it was a lesser included
offense to the charge of armed robbery. Id. at 1199 n.2.
Is Decoster's two accomplices had pleaded guilty to ordinary robbery only. On appeal,
Decoster alleged that because of this, he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting an
armed robbery and an assault with a dangerous weapon. The appellate court accepted this
paradox-an aider and abettor without a principal-as "a necessary result of the irration-
ality of plea bargaining." Id. at 1199 n.1.
16 Id. at 1199. The court was primarily concerned with evidence of the defense attor-
ney's inadequate trial preparation:
1) Counsel was delinquent in filing proper motions to arrange for Decoster's pre-trial cus-
tody release. Id. at 1199-1200.
2) Counsel announced "ready" for trial, but was unable to satisfy the government's alibi
notice demand. As a result, the attorney announced that he would proceed with the
trial without relying on an alibi defense. Id. at 1200.
3) Counsel attempted to waive a jury trial although the presiding judge had already heard
related evidence in connection with the guilty pleas by Decoster's companions. Id.
4) Before trial, Decoster petitioned the court and expressed dissatisfaction with his ap-
pointed attorney. Evidence at trial indicated that counsel had failed to communicate
with Decoster on important tactical matters. Id.
5) During the trial, the defense called only one witness other than Decoster, and on direct
examination this witness contradicted the accused on crucial facts. Id. at 1201.
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ord for supplemental hearings and granted Decoster leave to file
a motion for a new trial.17  After a district court judge denied the
motion, 18 a circuit court panel reversed, holding that the defense
attorney's failure to conduct a pretrial investigation had denied
Decoster effective assistance of counsel.' 9 On rehearing, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit en banc reinstated the conviction, hold-
ing that the representation Decoster received at trial satisfied the
requirements of the sixth amendment. The divided court2 °
unanimously criticized counsel's conduct, but ruled that Decoster
had failed to prove his trial attorney's deficiencies prejudiced his
case.
21
The conflicting Decoster opinons crystallized the incorporation
debate. All judges agreed that the defendant must show his
lawyer committed a substantial breach of duty to prove ineffec-
tiveness. 22  But in defining "substantial," they revealed the es-
sence of the lingering debate. For Judge MacKinnon, "substantial"
meant that the accused must demonstrate actual prejudice from
the alleged breach. 23  In his plurality opinion, Judge Leventhal
17 Id. at 1205. Procedurally, Decoster differs from most ineffective assistance of counsel
cases. Usually the accused is not permitted a direct appeal because of the significant time
delay. Green, Ward & Arcuri, Plea Bargaining: Fairness and Inadequacy of Representation, 7
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTs L. Rv. 495, 523 n.223 (1975). As an alternative, the prisoner
petitions for habeas corpus relief, and must prove that the "sentence was imposed in viola-
tion of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). On direct
appeal, however, a federal court may reverse a conviction without finding that counsel's
representation is constitutionally defective. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976). See, e.g., Dyer v.
United States, 379 F.2d 89, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113,
117 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Nonetheless, the Decoster court considered on direct appeal the con-
stitutional merits of the ineffective assistance claim.
'8 No. 72-1283, slip op. at 5 (Leventhal, J.).
19 Id.
20 Joining Judge Leventhal's plurality opinion were Judges McGowan, Tamm, and Wil-
key. Judges Tamm and Robb joined a second opinion by Judge MacKinnon. Judge Robin-
son filed an opinion concurring in the result only, while Chief Judge Wright joined Judge
Bazelon's dissenting opinion.
21 Judge Leventhal held that Decoster had failed to prove the likelihood of prejudice.
No. 72-1283, slip op. at 34 (Leventhal, J.). Judge MacKinnon determined that the accused
had failed to prove substantial prejudice. Id. at 33 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
22 Judge Leventhal, citing Judge Kaplan's opinion in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366
Mass. 89, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974), concluded that a "substantial" breach has to be "egregi-
ous and probably prejudicial." No. 72-1283, slip op. at 17 (Leventhal, J.). Judge Robinson
spoke of a "substantial deviation from a norm of reasonable competence." Id. at 4 (concur-
ring opinion, Robinson, J.). Judges MacKinnon and Bazelon referred to a "substantial vio-
lation of a duty owed ... by ... counsel." Id. at 33 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.); id.
at 26 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon, J.).
22 Judge MacKinnon stated that "the defendant lacks a substantial claim unless he
makes out a prima facie case showing (1) that counsel's constitutional duty toward him was
664 [Vol. 65:659
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incorporated a requirement of likely prejudice. 24  The nonincor-
porationists, Judges Robinson and Bazelon, defined "substantial"
without referring to prejudice. They suggested instead that the
court examine the "frequency and pervasiveness" of the lawyer's
deficient conduct. 25  The nonincorporationists would only
examine prejudice after finding a substantial breach of duty by
counsel, and only as part of a harmless error analysis, in which
the government bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the ineffectiveness did not injure the defendant.26
B. Incorporationist Theory
Incorporationists encounter two major problems in imposing
a prejudice requirement. They can neither satisfactorily justify the
rule nor adequately explain why the Supreme Court has failed to
impose this requirement in several ineffectiveness cases. Whether
the incorporationists require proof of actual harm or merely likely
prejudice, they fail to resolve these problems.
1. Analytical Models
The incorporationist approach appears to conflict with several
Supreme Court rulings that overturned convictions automatically
when effective assistance of counsel had been denied.27 In each
case the Court refused to require a showing that the constitutional
infraction had prejudicial impact. The incorporationists have con-
structed two analytical models to distinguish these cases.
a. Actual-Constructive Model. This model attempts to distin-
guish the actual denial of assistance, where the accused has no
lawyer, from the constructive denial of assistance, where the ac-
breached and (2) that he suffered unfair prejudice as a result of that breach." Id. at 19
(MacKinnon, J.).
24 Id. at 18 (Leventhal, J.).
25 Id. at 14 (concurring opinion, Robinson, J.); id. at 54 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon,
J.).
26 Id. at 36 (concurring opinion, Robinson, J.); id. at 59-61 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon,
J.). Judge MacKinnon, who requires that the defendant prove actual prejudice, would
never engage in harmless error analysis. But see note 72 infra. Because Judge Leventhal
incorporated only a requirement of likely prejudice, he would permit the government to
demonstrate harmless error after a defendant meets the likelihood burden. See notes 77-88
and accompanying text infra.
27 E.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S.
80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942).
1980]
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cused has an ineffective lawyer.2 8  In guaranteeing the "Assist-
ance of Counsel," the express language of the sixth amendment
makes an actual denial of the right impermissible per se.29  The
model suggests that this rule does not apply when a court consid-
ers a constructive denial of the underlying right. The distinction
"rests on the difference between the right explicitly granted in the
Constitution and the different formulation of the right created by
a judicial gloss on the Constitutional provision." 30  The model's
adherents see all automatic reversals as examples of an actual de-
nial of assistance. This frees them to incorporate a prejudice re-
quirement for constructive denial claims.
In Decoster, Judge MacKinnon supported this model with a
linguistic analysis: "It is plain from a glance at any dictionary that
when the [Supreme] Court used the term 'ineffective' it was con-
cerned with the impact that counsel's alleged failure may have on
the trial."31  He asserted that because the Court consistently fo-
cuses on effectiveness, rather than on attorney competence, the
accused must demonstrate prejudice to establish a constructive
denial.
3 2
This analysis is misleading because it ignores the circumstan-
tial use of "effective." The Supreme Court first considered the
effectiveness of counsel in Powell v. Alabama,33 where the defend-
28 United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 8-9, 30-33 (D.C. Cir., July 10,
1979) (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 302 (1979).
29 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
30 United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 33 n.28 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1979)
(concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
31 Id. (emphasis in original).
32 [I]f the Supreme Court had intended the one-dimensional inquiry proposed by
the dissent it could have focused solely on competence or performance. Its use
of the term "ineffective" is consistent with the view adopted by this and the
plurality opinion that prejudice is an element of an accused's constitutional
claim of ineffectiveness.
Id.
In McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974), the court justified this model
differently:
[We believe that there is an important and obvious difference between the total
absence of counsel in Gideon and the ineffective assistance of counsel in the
instant case. Since advice of counsel is so crucial to the exercise of a defendant's
other rights, a total absence of counsel cannot but be harmful. Yet where a
defendant is represented by counsel and it is the effectiveness of his counsel's
performance that has slipped below the acceptable standard, the seriousness of
this constitutional violation must be judged in terms of the particular factual
circumstances of that case.
Id. at 218.
33 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See note 5 supra.
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ants alleged that appointment of their attorney on the morning of
trial had rendered the aid ineffective. The attorney's competence
was not at issue, and understandably, the Court's language fo-
cused on counsel's effectiveness. Indeed, in the forty-seven years
since Powell, the Supreme Court has never directly considered a
sixth amendment allegation of incompetent performance by coun-
sel. 34  There is, therefore, little support for the argument that the
Supreme Court purposefully chose the word "ineffective" to im-
pose a prejudice requirement on defendants.
Moreover, to distinguish cases successfully, supporters of the
actual-constructive model must classify every automatic reversal
case as an actual denial of assistance. Several cases, however, do
not fit comfortably within this model. For example, the Supreme
Court automatically reversed the convictions of jointly represented
defendants because their attorney had a potential conflict of in-
terest. 35  An incorporationist, applying the actual-constructive
model, would classify this case as an actual denial. The Court,
however, was clearly concerned with the effectiveness of the
lawyer, rather than his complete absence.3 6  Similarly, the Su-
preme Court found an automatic denial of counsel, when a judge
dispensed with summation arguments in a non-jury trial.3 1 In-
a4 See note 6 supra. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court
confronted a closely related issue. The defendant unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus re-
lief from a guilty plea, alleging that the plea had been motivated by a prior forced confes-
sion. The defendant had failed to challenge the validity of the confession in state court,
which he could have done by pleading not guilty and attacking the admissibility of the
confession at trial. The Court declared that a habeas corpus hearing was unavailable unless
the defendant received incompetent advice. Id. at 772. "[Wlhether his plain bypass of state
remedies was an intelligent act depends on whether he was so incompetently advised by
counsel concerning the forum in which he should first present his federal claim that the
Constitution will afford him another chance to plead." Id. at 768-69. The Court found no
such incompetence. McMann is often cited to support a competence standard for ineffec-
tive assistance claims. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 n.2 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1976); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 693 (6th Cir.
1974). In Decoster, both incorporationists and nonincorporationists used McMann to support
their positions. No. 72-1283, slip op. at 9, 11, 14 (Leventhal, J.); id. at 27-28 n.24 (concur-
ring opinion, MacKinnon, J.); id. at 11 (concurring opinion, Robinson, J.); id. at 6 n.l 1, 58
n.129 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon, J.).
35 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942).
36 "More than 35 years ago, in Glasser v. United States, ... this Court held that by re-
quiring an attorney to represent two co-defendants whose interests were in conflict the
District Court had denied one of the defendants his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance'of counsel." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978) (emphasis added).
37 Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
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corporationists would also classify this case as an actual denial
since the Court did not require proof of prejudice. Like the joint
representation claim, however, this case focused on the effective-
ness of the attorney, rather than his absence. By awkwardly clas-
sifying such cases as actual denials, incorporationists undermine
any linguistic justification for the actual-constructive model.
38
b. Governmental Involvement Model. Judge Leventhal identified
four categories of ineffective assistance claims, positioned on a
continuum of governmental involvement: 39 (1) direct governmen-
tal interference involving statutes or court rulings-claims in this
category require no showing of prejudice and reversal is auto-
matic; 40 (2) multiple representation 41-the accused carries the
burden of showing that his lawyer has a likely conflict of in-
terest 4 2 -prejudice is irrebuttably presumed from the conflict and
38 Another example of this problem is Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
The defendant in Geders challenged a state court ruling that prohibited him from speaking
with his attorney during an overnight recess. The recess had come at the end of direct
testimony by the accused, but before cross-examination. Without requiring a showing of
prejudice, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the state court had
denied the defendant the assistance of counsel. Although the accused had been rep-
resented by competent counsel throughout his trial, and although the denial involved only
17 hours, Judge MacKinnon classified Geders as another actual denial case. Decoster, No.
72-1283, slip op. at 40 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), forces the model into an apparent incon-
sistency. In Wade, a pretrial line-up was conducted in the absence of a defense attorney.
The Court ruled that assistance of counsel was guaranteed in such pretrial proceedings
"where the results might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere
formality." Id. at 224. Yet in Wade the Court did not apply an automatic reversal rule.
Instead, it remanded the case to determine whether the denial was harmless error. Id. at
242. See also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
All theories of ineffective assistance have difficulty accounting for the results in these
cases. Commentators, however, sometimes ignore the problem by focusing exclusively on
social policy issues. See, e.g., Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal
Defense Counsel: A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980);
Comment, Current Standards for Determining Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Still a Sham, Farce
or Mockey?, 1979 S. ILL. U.L. REV. 132; Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Who Bears
the Burden of Proof, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 29 (1977).
" Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 5-9 (Leventhal, J.).
40 Id. at 7. This category includes the complete absence of counsel cases. E.g., Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Judge Leventhal
noted that all these cases involve identifiable impediments to the right to counsel and "are
susceptible to easy correction by prophylactic rules." Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 7
(Leventhal, J.). This suggests that automatic reversal hinges on considerations of judicial
efficiency as well as state involvement.
41 Id. at 7-8. This category restates the law of Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475
(1978) and Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
42 In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 478 (1978), The Court was unwilling to mandate
that every defendant have separate representation. The Court explained that joint rep-
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reversal follows; 43 (3) late appointment of counsel 44 -injury to
the accused is presumed, but the government may prove harmless
error; 4 (4) no governmental action affecting the defense lawyer's
performance.46 In this category, which includes incompetent
resentation may sometimes be beneficial to the defense. "Joint representation is a means of
insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength against a
common attack." Id. at 482-83 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942)
(dissenting opinion, Frankfurter, J.)).
43 Id. at 489-90. In Holloway, the basis for finding potential conflict was unmistakable.
During the trial, three jointly represented co-defendants asked to testify. Their attorney
explained to the court that under the circumstances he was unable to direct examination
properly, and that separate counsel should be appointed. The trial court denied this re-
quest without a hearing. The Supreme Court did not assess the validity of the attorney's
conflict of interest allegation, reasoning that the attorney performed a dual role as an
officer of the court. The court postulated that the attorney was precluded "from exploring
possible plea negotiations," and therefore presumed the existence of prejudice. Id. at 489-
90. Having determined that prejudice was inherent, the Court refused to apply harmless
error. See note 88 infra.
44 Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 8-9 (Leventhal, J.).
15 Judge Leventhal deduces this rule from Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
The defense attorney in Chambers failed to object to clearly inadmissible evidence, and the
petitioner claimed that late appointment of counsel caused the failure. The Supreme Court
clearly defined the scope of the claim when it stated that "No charge is made that [defense
counsel] was incompetent or inexperienced; rather the claim is that his appearance for
petitioner was so belated that he could not have furnished effective legal assistance . I.." d.
at 53. The Court determined, however, that the erroneous admission of evidence was
harmless. Reasoning that the ineffectiveness was necessarily without prejudice, the Court
denied relief.
Justice Harlan objected to the majority's narrow interpretation of the ineffectiveness
claim. The real harm in late appointment of counsel, he stated, is that it may result in the
denial of the "opportunity for appointed counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and
to prepare his defense." Id. at 59 (quoting Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940)).
He continued:
It is not an answer to petitioner's claim for a reviewing court simply to conclude
that he has failed after the fact to show that, with adequate assistance, he would
have prevailed at trial.... Further inquiry might show, of course, that counsel's
opportunity for preparation was adequate to protect petitioner's interests....
Id. at 60 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
Since Decoster did not involve late appointment of counsel, Judge Leventhal did not
pursue the analysis of this category. In particular, he failed to consider whether prejudice
should be examined as part of the prima facie claim or as harmless error. Since he segre-
gated late appointment cases from inadequate performance cases. (See notes 46-48 and
accompanying text infra) it is possible he believed the treatment of prejudice should be
different in each category, and that in a late appointment case, the government must prove
harmless error. Judge MacKinnon, however, explicitly applied Chambers to support his as-
sertion that the burden of proving actual prejudice rests with the accused. Decoster, No.
72-1283, slip op. at 45-46 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.). But Chambers did not say
who bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. See note 124 and accompanying text
infra.
46 In these cases, counsel's performance is "'untrammelled and unimpaired' by state
action." No. 72-1283, slip. op. at 9 (Leventhal, J.) (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
478, 482 (1978)).
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performance claims like Decoster, the accused must always prove
that the ineffectiveness has prejudiced his case.47 Thus, under
this model, as governmental involvement decreases, the defendant
assumes a greater burden of proving that he was prejudiced.
By conceding that in some constructive denial cases the ac-
cused need not prove prejudice, the governmental involvement
model appears to explain the automatic reversal cases. 48  But the
reasoning behind the continuum is unclear. Prosecutorial in-
volvement satisfies the "state action" requirement 49 regardless of
whether the ineffectiveness results from statutory restrictions,
joint representation, late appointment, or attorney incompe-
tence. 50  Since each category involves a denial of the same con-
stitutional guarantee, defendants should have like protection at all
levels of governmental involvement. 51  State action is a threshold
issue; it should not define the right.
" In Decoster, Judge Leventhal required the accused to show "a likelihood that counsel's
inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial," but permitted the government to avoid re-
versal by proving that the conviction "is not tainted by the deficiency, and that in fact no
prejudice resulted." Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 21 (Leventhal, J.). For a discussion of
the "likelihood compromise," see notes 84-88 and accompanying text infra. Alternatively,
incorporationists could apply the governmental involvement model and require proof of
actual prejudice when such involvement is minimal. See, e.g., id., at 31, 33 (concurring opin-
ion, MacKinnon, J.). A tougher standard for the accused would require proof that the
government knowingly or negligently permitted the ineffective representation. See
Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336-37 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (applying this stan-
dard to cases including privately retained counsel).
4' Like the actual-constructive model, however, the governmental involvement model
fails to account for pre-trial denial cases such as United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967). See note 38 supra.
9 "ITihe Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment apply only to those acts which
are somehow connected to governmental or 'state' action." Glennon & Nowak, A Functional
Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221, 221.
50 See Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Re-
lief, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. 289, 296-301 (1964). Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(finding state action from judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants). Some courts have
questioned the presence of sufficient state action when a defendant alleges ineffective assis-
tance from privately retained counsel. See United States ex rel. Darcy v. Hardy, 203 F.2d
407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953). Compare Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137,
1139 n.4 (8th Cir. 1974) and People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d 412, 421 n.9, 590 P.2d 859, 863
n.9, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 736 n.9 (1979) (suggesting that standards vary when counsel is
retained rather than appointed), with West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1032-33 (5th Cir.
1973) (applying same standard, whether counsel court appointed or privately retained).
s The focus in effectiveness-of-counsel cases should be on the representation a
defendant gets, not on whether his inadequate representation results on the one
hand from his lawyer's sloth, indifference or lack of capacity, or on the other
from denial of an opportunity for the lawyer to do his job. The effect on the
defendant in either event is the same, and the issue is whether he received the
representation he was constitutionally entitled to. The only thing that distin-
guishes this class of factors causing ineffectiveness is that the state is implicated
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2. The Prejudice Requirement
Even if incorporationists can satisfactorily explain the auto-
matic reversal cases, they must still justify the imposition of a
prejudice requirement. Their approach derives from at least three
sources: (a) the fifth amendment underpinnings of the right to
effective aid; (b) traditional common law principles allocating the
burden of proof; and (c) the privacy of attorney-client relation-
ships, and the adversary criminal justice system. 52
a. The Fifth Amendment Analogy. In Decoster, Judge MacKinnon
asserted that because the right to counsel comes from both the
fifth and sixth amendments, courts may transfer fifth amendment
methodology to sixth amendment cases. 53 Murphy v. Florida 5 4 is
the focus of this analogy. In Murphy, the defendant alleged that
the jury's knowledge of his notorious criminal record had denied
him due process. Unwilling to apply an automatic reversal rule,
the Supreme Court searched for "any indications in the totality of
circumstances that petitioner's trial was not fundamentally
fair." 55 After concluding that the accused had failed to dem-
onstrate prejudice, the Court denied relief.5 6 "[Iun light of Fifth
for acting in a fashion which unreasonably affects the guilt-determining process.
Although the involvement of the state may be a more serious matter than the
conduct of defense counsel when it comes time to determine the relief to be
provided, the constitutional question is still the same: Under all the cir-
cumstances, has the accused received representation of the quality to be ex-
pected from a lawyer of ordinary skill and care?
Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59
VA. L. REv. 927, 938-39 (1973) (footnote omitted).
51 Incorporationists also use case precedent to support their argument. See Decoster, No.
72-1283, slip op. at 3-20 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.). But precedent provides lim-
ited support for imposition of a prejudice requirement, since some courts have never di-
rectly focused on the incorporation debate. On a case-by-case basis, they avoid the issue
either by finding prejudice without declaring it a necessary requirement (see, e.g., United
States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1122-23 (1st Cir. 1978)), or by holding that counsel's per-
formance is not substantially inadequate (see, e.g., United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863,
865-66 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978); Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62,
65-66 (2d Cir. 1976)). Furthermore, recent changes in the standards that define ineffec-
tiveness (see notes 4-5 supra) undermine the usefulness of precedent in many circuits. The
debate in Decoster illustrates this problem. Compare No. 72-1283, slip op. at 18-23 (Leven-
thai, J.) and id. at 3-20 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.), with id. at 36-39 (concurring
opinion, Robinson, J.) and id. at 6-8 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon, J.).
5' Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 21 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
54 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
55 Id. at 799.
'" The Court stated, "Petitioner has failed to show that the setting of the trial was
inherently prejudicial, or that the jury-selection process of which he complains permits an
inference of actual prejudice." Id. at 803.
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Amendment cases like Murphy," Judge MacKinnon wrote in Decos-
ter, "courts should be wary of declaring certain acts or omissions
of counsel, without proof of prejudice, to be per se Constitutional
violations .... " ,,57
This analogy overlooks the significant distinction between
fifth and sixth amendment claims. Although the early right to
counsel cases treated effective representation as an "incident of a
fair trial," solely within the scope of the due process clause, sub-
sequent cases directly applied the sixth amendment. 58  In cases
like Murphy,59 courts apply broad due process concepts of funda-
mental fairness. Unlike cases involving more specific constitutional
guarantees, such as the right to counsel, a due process claim
inherently requires proof of prejudice. A preferable analogy
would involve other specific constitutional rights. For example,
the Supreme Court protects a defendant's right to confront wit-
nesses, a sixth amendment guarantee, without incorporating a
prejudice requirement. 60  Similarly, a criminal defendant need
not prove prejudice to demonstrate a denial of the privilege
against self-incrimination, a specific fifth amendment guaran-
tee. 61  Even fourth amendment violations carry a presumption of
prejudice, although the government may prove harmless error to
avoid reversal. 2 In effect, Judge MacKinnon assumed a result by
selecting his analogy.
63
Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 23 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
28 See note 2 supra.
-5 See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
'o See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (petitioner denied right of effective
cross-examination; government proof of absence of prejudice unavailing). Cf Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969)
(determining that although confrontation right denied, government proved harmless er-
ror).
61 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518 (1963) (admission of involuntary con-
fession reversible error regardless of "substantial independent evidence tending to dem-
onstrate the guilt of the petitioner"); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963) (admis-
sion of involuntary confession reversible error; harmless error inapplicable). Compare Grif-
fin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (automatically reversing conviction because of
prosecutor's comments to jury on defendant's failure to testify) with Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18 (1967) (comments by trial judge regarding failure of defendant to testify re-
versible error because prosecution could not prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable
doubt).
62 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (upholding conviction because
illegally sezied and admitted evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Since Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court has limited the scope of the exclusionary
rule. See, e.g, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) (finding no constitutional re-
quire-ment of habeas corpus relief from a state court conviction where illegally seized evi-
dence introduced at trial); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary
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b. Common Law Allocation of the Burden of Proof. Pointing to
fundamental common law principles, 64 Judge MacKinnon noted
that a claimant has the burden of persuasion on each element of
his claim except where "'the material necessary to prove or dis-
prove an element "lies particularly within the knowledge" of the
defendant.' "65 He concluded that in an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, both the general rule and the exception require
that the accused prove prejudice. 6
This argument is conclusory, not explanatory. It first assumes
that prejudice is an element of the claim, and then applies com-
mon law rules to allocate burdens of proof.6 7  As a reason for
rule not applicable to grand jury proceedings); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223
(1973) (standing to invoke exclusionary rule granted only to victim of illegally obtained
evidence). Nonetheless, the Court has not altered its requirement that the government
prove harmless error to avoid reversal. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 162 (1977);
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1963).
63 A more appropriate analogy supporting Judge MacKinnon's analysis is the treatment
of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court recognizes that proof
of prejudice is one of several factors to be weighed in judging a speedy trial claim. Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972). Judge Robinson, anticipating this analogy, pointed
to features of the right to a speedy trial that distinguish it from other sixth amendment
guarantees. He noted that the guarantee is not solely for the defendant's protection; it also
protects society's interest in having criminals promptly incarcerated. Furthermore, the dep-
rivation of the right may work to an accused's advantage. "Finally, unlike many other pro-
tections that can be safeguarded through exclusion of tainted evidence or reversal for a
new trial, the only remedy for a speedy-trial violation is dismissal of the charge." Decoster,
No. 72-1283, slip op. at 31 n. 119 (concurring opinion, Robinson, J.). In Dickey v. Florida,
398 U.S. 30 (1970), Justice Brennan noted the Court's deviation from traditional sixth
amendment analysis.
Within the context of Sixth Amendment rights, the defendant generally
does not have to show that he was prejudiced by the denial of counsel, confron-
tation, public trial, an impartial jury, knowledge of the charges against him,
trial in the district where the crime was committed, or compulsory process.
.*. Because concrete evidence that their denial caused the defendant substantial
prejudice is often unavailable, prejudice must be assumed, or constitutional
rights will be denied without remedy. Prejudice is an issue ... only if the gov-
ernment wishes to argue harmless error.
398 U.S. at 54-55 (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
64 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2486 (3d ed. 1940).
'5 Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 24 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.). (quoting
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 512 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426
U.S. 290 (1976)).
66 Id. at 25.
7 judge Robinson responded to the assertion that because ineffective representation is
particularly within the knowledge of the accused, the defendant should bear the burden of
proof: "This argument overlooks the distinction between establishing substantially deficient
representation, and identifying the effect of the deficiency.... [Oince counsel's deficiencies
have been documented, resolution of an issue of injury to the defendant's interests does
not require peculiar reference to evidence controlled by the defendant." Id. at 35 n.137
(concurring opinion, Robinson, J.).
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incorporating a prejudice requirement, the argument is unpersua-
sive.
68
More fundamentally, the argument contradicts the underly-
ing principles of the harmless error doctrine. 69  The Supreme
Court has strictly limited the use of "harmless-constitutional-
error"7 0 by requiring proof that the constitutional error is harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt.7 This rule creates an explicit
presumption that all constitutional violations are prejudicial. Ac-
cordingly, the burden of proving harmlessness always rests with
the government. Incorporationists avoid this result by including
the prejudice requirement in the definition of the constitutional
error. But in forcing the accused to prove injury, they reverse the
explicit presumption that all constitutional errors are harmful.
72
c. Attorney-Client Relations and the Adversarial System. The in-
corporationists also argue that a proof of prejudice requirement
protects attorney-client relations and preserves the adversarial
process, 73 making the requirement a necessary alternative to
68 Judge MacKinnon posed this argument to justify incorporating prejudice into the
effectiveness claim, not merely to alter traditional burden of proof allocations in harmless
error analysis. Id. at 3 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
69 Harmless error is a statutory privilege permitting the government to avoid reversal
of criminal convictions "for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of
having changed the result of the trial." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). A
typical statutory formulation of the harmless error rule is FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a): "Any
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disre-
garded." See also 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976): "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of cer-
tiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record with-
out regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." See
generally Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a
Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1976); Note, Principles for Application of the Harmless Error
Standard, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 616 (1974).
70 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
71 Id. at 24.
712 Ironically, Judge MacKinnon rejected the propriety of using harmless error at all, as
it "does not apply to 'constitutional' errors that 'affect substantial rights' of a party." Decos-
ter, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 29 n.24 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.) (quoting Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. at 23). "It is our view that the Constitutional violation is not
made out until the defendant has carried his complete burden; at that point in inadequate
assistance cases, the analysis is over and the harmless error doctrine does not apply." Id.
(emphasis in original). In another portion of his opinion, Judge MacKinnon contradicted
this analysis. Responding to Judge Bazelon's interpretation of Chapman, that "the burden in
each case rests squarely on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the]
error was harmless" (id. at 60-61 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon, J.)), Judge MacKinnon
stated, "I have no quarrel with that interpretation of Chapman: once a constitutional error
is proven the burden of proceeding does shift to the government to prove that the error is
harmless." Id. at 44 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
73 Id. at 25-29 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
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harmless error.74  They allege that the difficult burden of prov-
ing harmlessness 75 encourages the government to monitor the de-
fense's activities in order to shelter convictions from potential
sixth amendment attacks. They charge that prosecutors might ac-
tively investigate the adequacy of counsel's trial preparation and
ultimately invade the privacy of attorney-defendant relation-
ships.
76
But this overstates the problem. Even the nonincor-
porationists require that a defendant prove a substantial breach of
duty before they examine harmlessness.77 Little incentive exists
for a prosecutor to conduct an overly aggressive investigation of
the defense. And to the extent that an incentive arises, courts
could establish procedures for monitoring a prosecutor's inves-
tigatory conduct.
7 8
Incorporationists also fear that the harmless error approach
could alter the role of the trial judge. They envision prosecutors,
in an effort to protect their cases, requesting that the judge cor-
rect erroneous decisions of the defense. "[T]he result could well
be judicial supervision of many of the tactical trial decisions of
defense counsel." 79 Nevertheless, "[it is the judge, not counsel,
,' See notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra.
7 The government must prove harmless error "beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S 18, 22 (1967). This is not an insurmountable task, however, as Judge
Robinson's opinion demonstrates. See Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 42 (concurring opin-
ion, Robinson, J.).
76 See id. at 25-27 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.). The government may already
have a moral obligation to investigate defense attorney deficiencies. See ABA STANDARDS,
The Prosecution Function § 3.11(C), at 93 (1974). This corresponds with the Supreme
Court's description of the unique role of a prosecutor:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
The incorporationists' concern for protecting the privacy of attorney-client relations is
questionable for another reason. As Judge Bazelon noted, "IT]he attorney-client privilege
is designed to protect the client, not the attorney. It is incongruous to suggest that the
sanctity of that privilege should act as a shield to block efforts at safeguarding the defen-
dant's rights." Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 75 n.162 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon, J.).
17 See note 100 and accompanying text infra.
78 Courts could establish informal procedures for authorizing and controlling an inves
tigation. For example, a court could require the prosecutor to show just cause, as a pre-
requisite, and could demand a list of particulars narrowly defining the scope of the pro-
posed investigation. Furthermore, the court could impose sanctions if the prosecutor
abuses the investigatory privilege. For an example of similar proposals concerning the
judge's direct control over defense counsel, see note 82 and accompanying text infra.
79 Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 26 (concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
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who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and
lawful trial."8 0 A judge need not violate principles of judicial
neutrality by taking an active role in this context.8' Indeed, by
supervising the effectiveness of a defendant's representation, the
judge protects the adversarial quality of the system.8 2  It is
speculative, at best, to assume that because ineffective assistance is
defined without reference to prejudice, "[o]ur adversary system
will be tortured out of shape." 83
3. The Likelihood Compromise
In Decoster, Judge Leventhal formulated a slightly different
incorporationist theory. Under his approach, the accused must
show a "likelihood" that the alleged ineffectiveness had an impact
on the trial; 84 once he does, the government must prove harmless
error to avoid reversal. This compromise attempts to balance
the social costs of a more liberal standard 85 against the legal in-
consistencies of an actual prejudice requirement. Judge Leventhal
80 Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978). See also McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970): "[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to
serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel
.... J]udges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who
are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts."
8' Cf. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975)
(questioning the utility and propriety of the criminal adversary system as a means of find-
ing truth).
82 One method of monitoring effectiveness is to abandon the mere "Is defense ready?"
interrogation at trial. This could be replaced with an extensive checklist of inquiries to
insure adequate trial preparation. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 72-73 (dissenting opin-
ion, Bazelon, J.). See also Tague, The Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, 15
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 164 n.285 (1977); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL
L. REV. 1077, 1119 (1973).
83 Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 35 (Leventhal, J.).
84 Id. at 36-37. See Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 87, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974).
85 "Our approach toward the minimum legal obligations of our democratic society to
ward off injustice may be more earthbound, but in our view it is more salutary." Decoster,
No. 72-1283, slip op. 42 (Leventhal, J.). This reflects the concern that under a more strin-
gent approach, 'Judgments would be under constant attack, and judges 'would become
Penelopes, forever engaged in unravelling the webs they wove.'" Commonwealth v. Safer-
ian, 366 Mass. 89, 99, 315 N.E.2d 878, 884 (1974) (quoting L. Hand, J., in Jorgensen v.
York Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947)). But
the nonincorporationist approach may be more efficient, since it attempts to define coun-
sel's duties objectively. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text infra. Such objective stan-
dards decrease judicial discretion and the consequent possibility of reversible error. See,
e.g., United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916-17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (affirming denial of
motion for new trial because appellant failed to support ineffective assistance claim with
documentary evidence).
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argued that requiring the government to demonstrate harmless-
ness is unnecessary and unreasonable where the defendant has
not shown a likelihood of prejudice. Consider, for example, the
case of an accused who tells his lawyer that he has no alibi de-
fense. This defendant can hardly claim ineffective representation
if his lawyer fails to interrogate potential alibi witnesses. Judge
Leventhal would say that no likelihood of prejudice exists. But
courts would reach the same result without applying a likelihood
rule by examining the reasonableness of the attorney's conduct. In
the above example, there is no basis for claiming ineffectiveness
because counsel's actions are not demonstrably unreasonable.
Moreover, even if special circumstances indicate lawyer negli-
gence,86 the absence of a likelihood of prejudice will surface dur-
ing the harmless error analysis.
Ultimately, the likelihood compromise fails to reconcile the
conflict between incorporation theory and harmless error. A court
cannot logically hold that ineffectiveness is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt if the defendant has already proved a likelihood
of prejudice.8 7 The likelihood ruling decides the claim and
therefore accomplishes the same result as the actual prejudice
rule; it improperly places the burden of proving harmfulness on
the defendant. 88
86 For example, extraneous evidence might indicate that the attorney could not reason-
ably have relied on his client's assertions. Under these circumstances, the duty to investi-
gate would not automatically vanish.
• "' For a discussion of the practical meaning of different harmless error proof stan-
dards, see Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 538,
550-52 (1979). Some commentators have suggested that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt stan-
dard requires a 76-95% certainty. Id. at 550 n.55.
88 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), suggests another practical problem with
the likelihood rule -the probability that ineffective assistance will prejudice a defendant's
ability to negotiate a favorable plea. The Hollowayv Court stated that harm during plea
bargaining automatically establishes a presumption of prejudice:
Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends
to prevent the attorney from doing. For example, in this case it may well have
precluded defense counsel ... from exploring possible plea negotiations and
the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser
charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be accepta-
ble. ... [T]he evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations
and in the sentencing process.
Id. at 489-90 (emphasis in original).
The ramifications of prejudice during plea negotiations are significant. The Supreme
Court has endorsed plea bargaining as "an essential component of the administration of
justice," Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971), and commentators estimate that
90% of all criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966); H. MILLER, W.
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C. Nonincorporationist Theory
The nonincorporationists carefully distinguish between pro-
cedural due process and substantive sixth amendment law. "Fun-
damental fairness" is the standard of ordinary due process.
89
When a court reviews an alleged denial of this guarantee, it ap-
praises the "totality of facts in a given case" and determines
whether the accused has been prejudiced. 90 In Gideon v. Wain-
wright,"1 the Supreme Court shunned this approach, recognizing
that the right to counsel comes from the sixth amendment, not
the due process clause. :9 2  The Court therefore reversed Gideon's
conviction without requiring a showing of prejudice. Nonincor-
porationists follow this distinction when they assert that prejudice
is also irrelevant to a claim of ineffective assistance. 
9 3
McDONALD & J. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 18-22 (1978) (suggesting
that statistics vary widely regardless of size of jurisdiction, but confirming that Newman's
estimates are reasonable).
Decoster illustrates the importance of this issue. Evidence during the trial indicated that
a possible plea bargain had been discussed. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 53 n.120
(dissenting opinion, Bazelon, j.). Also, Decoster's accomplices, represented by other
lawyers, pleaded guilty to a lesser charge. United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1199
(D.C. Cir. 1973). These circumstances suggest the likelihood that Decoster's ability to bar-
gain a plea effectively was prejudiced. Judge Robinson rejected this argument, noting that
Decoster did not raise the issue on appeal, He also noted that Decoster failed to allege
specific facts to support his contention, as required by United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d
908 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and failed to demonstrate his amenability to such a plea. Decoster, No.
72-1283, slip op. 42 n.158 (concurring opinion, Robinson, J.).
89 "The phrase [due process] formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those
envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is
less a matter of rule." Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
- Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of
facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other
circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such de-
nial.
Id. at 462.
" 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
92 In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court had ruled that the more "fluid"
due process analysis applied to assistance of counsel claims in state courts. Gideon overruled
Betts by deciding that because the assistance of counsel is fundamental to a fair trial, this
sixth amendment right is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338-39.
93 "The Sixth Amendment right to counsel proscribes with equal force denials of
reasonably competent and effective counsel, for '[it has long been recognized that the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' " Cooper v. Fitzharris,
586 F.2d 1325, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979) (concurring and
dissenting opinion, Hufstedler, J.) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970)). See note 5 supra.
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Nonincorporationists also argue that a prejudice requirement
conflicts with the harmless-constitutional-error doctrine, :4 which
protects fundamental rights by requiring the government to prove
an absence of prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. They assert
that courts should examine prejudice in an ineffective assistance
of counsel case, if at all,:9 5 only in a harmless error analysis. In-
corporationist theories, they argue, improperly shift burdens of
proof.
Nonincorporationists measure effective representation by
focusing on the reasonableness of the attorney's conduct, rather
than its impact. Accordingly, "the defendant establishes a constitu-
tional violation when he makes out a substantial breach of duty by
his counsel ... .""9 Adherents to this approach identify specific
obligations of counsel by referring to accepted performance
guidelines.17  These guidelines 98 provide an objective yardstick
for measuring the "frequency and pervasiveness of defense coun-
sel's omissions and failures" " and permit the nonincorporationists
to determine whether a breach is substantial without examining
prejudicial impact. t °
. See notes 69-72 and accompanying text supra.
See note 12 supra.
Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 14 (concurring opinion, Robinson, J.).
'7 See Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011
(1978); United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The following
sources provide such guidelines: ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESP6NSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL
CANONS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1978); ABA STANDARDS, RELATING TO THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION (1974); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS (1973).
"8 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 97, at § 3.2(a) (duty to interview accused
promptly to determine facts known); § 3.6(a) (duty to inform accused of his rights, includ-
ing duty to make pretrial release motions); § 3.8 (duty to inform client of case develop-
ments and defense preparation); § 4.1 (duty to investigate and explore "all avenues leading
to facts relevant to guilt ... to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and
law enforcement authorities.... [and] to investigate ... regardless of the accused's admis-
sions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or ... desire to plead guilty"); §
5.1(a) (duty to advise accused concerning all aspects of case including probable outcome); §
5.2(b) (duty to make strategic and tactical decisions after consultation with clients). But cf.
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
974 (1979) ("[lt would be unwise to restrict the constitutional requirement to a list of
essential elements applicable to all of the infinite variety of factual situations that arise.").
Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 42 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon, J.).
"" The nonincorporationists do not allege that every breach of duty rises to the level of
ineffective representation. They specifically require that the violation be substantial. See
Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 41-42 (dissenting opinion, Bazelon, J.); Cooper v. Fitzhar-
ris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1340 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (concurring and dissenting opinion,
Hufstedler, J.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). The substantiality requirement comes in
part from McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970), where the Supreme Court
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Also, nonincorporationists argue that a prejudice requirement
improperly distinguishes between the rights guaranteed the inno-
cent, and those guaranteed the guilty.' t In American jurispru-
dence, "guilt" is a function of legal processes, not a description of
factual circumstances.'0 2 By requiring the accused to prove prej-
udice, the incorporationists are ultimately demanding evidence of
innocence.' 0 3  But such evidence may be missing from the trial
record because of the lawyer's ineffectiveness. Therefore, the prej-
udice requirement undermines important process values of crimi-
nal procedure.'0 4
referred to the necessity of proving "serious derelictions on the part of counsel." This
requirement also avoids a conflict with the plain error doctrine. See FED. R. CRINf. P. 52(b)
("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court") (emphasis added). The plain error doctrine permits
a court to review isolated trial errors, and to reverse a conviction when the defendant can
show a high probability of prejudice. United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1143 (9th
Cir.) (prosecutorial error), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1977). Without a substantiality re-
quirement, plain errors could be advanced as ineffective assistance of counsel claims, thus
permitting the accused to avoid the burden of demonstrating plain error prejudice. See
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1333 (advancing this anomaly as a reason for requiring
prejudice in ineffectiveness claims). Cf United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th
Cir. 1976) (refusing to find plain error, but remanding case because of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel).
101 See Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811 (1976); Baze-
Ion, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1973).
102 Cf Note, supra note 87, at 541 (discussing erosion of the distinction as a general
problem of harmless error analysis).
103 Judge MacKinnon implicitly expressed this view in Decoster: "We now know, on the
basis of Decoster's admission at sentencing . . . that he was guilty .... Even without Decos-
ter's admissions, it would be hard to imagine a case with more certain proof of guilt and
with less room for creditable contrary evidence." Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 38-39
(concurring opinion, MacKinnon, J.).
Incorporationists also suggest that guilt or innocence should color the quality of rep-
resentation. For example, responding to the dissent's claim that an attorney's duty to inves-
tigate is not relieved by a perception of his client's guilt or innocence, Judge MacKinnon
wrote in Decoster: "This pronouncement is foreign to a lawyer's basic obligation to the court
and his profession. When, as here, defense counsel has reasonable grounds for believing
his client guilty, that perception must influence his representation of the client." Id. at 50-51
(emphasis in original). See also United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 865 n.2 (6th Cir.),
("As a matter of both practical and constitutional significance, we note that counsel's obligation
to conduct an independent, factual investigation is substantially diminished once counsel
has reasonable cause to believe his client guilty.") (emphasis added) cert. denied, 439 U.S.
842 (1978). Cf Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.
Cm. L. REV. 142 (1970).
104 Nonincorporationists also assert that a prejudice requirement negates "the educative
impact that the 'reasonable competency' test could have in providing guidance to practicing
attorneys about standards of professional competency." Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d
1325, 134-42 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (concurring and dissenting opinion, Hufstedler, J.),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). Bar association grievance procedures and post-conviction
civil remedies have proved inadequate to improve lawyer quality. S. KRANTZ, RIGHT TO
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II
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
Nonincorporationists correctly assess the significance of
Gideon v. Wainwright.t0 5 Gideon permanently altered constitutional
law by holding that the right to counsel is a protected liberty
interest, fully applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.""6 By abandoning ordinary due process methodol-
ogy,0'0 Gideon converted all assistance of counsel cases into sixth
amendment claims. Because of Gideon, a denial of the right to
counsel always requires automatic reversal.
Implicitly, Gideon also converted the right to effective assistance
of counsel into a sixth amendment guarantee. 08 Accordingly,
whenever ineffective aid is equivalent to a denial of the assistance
of counsel, reversal must follow automatically. By demonstrating
equivalence, an accused establishes a sixth amendment claim.
To measure equivalence, however, courts must formulate
rules. In his article, Constitutional Common Law t0°1 Professor
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 198-200 (1976). By focusing on lawyer impact, rather than
performance, courts tacitly wink at attorney incompetence and ignore their responsibility
"to ensure that a criminal defendant receives a fair trial." United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d
1113, 1124 (1st Cir. 1978) (citations omitted). See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
105 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See notes 89-93 and accompanying text supra.
10! Id. at 339.
107 See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
10s See Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas
Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973), supra note 51, at 932-37.
Gideon established that, because of the nature of the adversary system, it is in-
herently unfair to prosecute a defendant who is without benefit of counsel. The
point is elementary that the right to counsel is hollow when counsel is not effec-
tive. The same policies that lie behind the Gideon right to counsel apply with
equal force to the requirement that counsel be effective.
Id. at 935. Before Gideon, the Supreme Court had recognized that in federal proceedings
the sixth amendment guaranteed effective representation. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). As applied to state courts, the "effective aid" gloss developed as an
element of due process. See notes 2 & 4 supra. Reflecting the implications of Gideon, the
Court has repeatedly reviewed state proceedings and referred to the sixth amendment
right to effective assistance. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481 (1978);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). See also Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc) ("[T]he standard which prevails in federal cases
under the Sixth Amendment should be applied equally to state convictions, to which the
same guarantee is made applicable by the Fourteenth Amendment under Gideon v. Wain-
wright.").
309 Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: "Constitutional Common Law", 89
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975) A thorough consideration of the assumptions underlying Professor
Monaghan's theory is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion that challenges its
textual and philosophical justifications, see Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional
Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1117 (1978). But see Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 157
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Monaghan distinguishes between constitutional rules and consti-
tutional common law. True constitutional rules permanently
structure the constitution's meaning by defining the minimum
requirements of a right. 110 The constitutional common law,
however, expands these minimum requirements by implementing
discretionary subconstitutional objectives."1  The constitutional
common law forms "a substructure of substantive, procedural and
remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but
not required by, various constitutional provisions."1 12
[Tihe distinction between true constitutional rules and constitu-
tional common law lies in the clarity with which the former is
perceived to be related to the core policies underlying the con-
stitutional provision....
... The more a rule is perceived to rest upon debatable
policy choices or uncertain empirical foundations the more
likely it will be seen to be common law. 13
This theory provides a useful framework for understanding and
formulating rules of equivalence for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel cases.
1 14
The Supreme Court has already established rules for some
ineffective aid claims. For example, in Holloway v. Arkansas,"5 the
(2d Cir. 1978) (en banc) (applying theory to create a private right of action from the
fourteenth amendment), vacated, 439 U.S. 974 (1978) (holding doctrine, as applied, un-
necessary).
110 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (protecting speech that
advocates use of force "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (prohibiting "a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with 'actual malice.' ").
"' See, e.g., the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), as applied in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975). This rule implements important fourth amendment policies, but is not itself an
essential element of the Constitution. Monaghan, supra note 109, at 3-10. The "warnings"
requirement of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) is another example of constitu-
tional common law. Monaghan, supra note 109, at 2, 20-23. Like the common law gloss on
any ordinary federal statute, constitutional common law may be altered by the express
word of Congress. Id. at 31.
112 Id. at 2-3.
'3 Id. at 33-34.
114 Professor Monaghan suggested such an approach when he stated that "[o]ne could
also fashion common law, grounded on the right to counsel .. ." Id. at 43.
115 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
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Court determined that joint representation by a lawyer with con-
flicting interests is equivalent to a denial of the assistance of coun-
sel. 1 6  Accordingly, when this occurs, reversal is automatic."1
7
The rule is constitutional because it is closely "related to the core
policies underlying the constitutional provision." 118 The right to
counsel affects an accused's ability to assert all his other rights,"'
and for this reason, it is necessary for a fair trial. This policy is
directly undermined, however, "when the advocate's conflicting
obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters." 120
In Holloway, the Court protected the underlying policy by for-
mulating a constitutionally compelled rule of equivalence.
Geders v. United States 121 provides another constitutional rule.
In Geders, a trial court had prevented an accused from meeting
with his attorney during an overnight recess. The Supreme Court
overturned the conviction without considering whether the de-
fendant had been prejudiced. 122  Thus, Geders equates the partial
denial of assistance with the complete absence of counsel. Pre-
sumably, the Court did not formulate this constitutional rule to
remedy an injustice in the case at hand, but rather, to curb the
extraordinary potential for abuse. Only by creating a prophylactic
rule could the Court advance the underlying fair trial policy.
23
1,6 Id. at 487-91. See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76, (1942).
,5? Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1978). See note 41 supra.
118 Monaghan, supra note 109, at 33.
". "Of all of the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by
counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to to assert any other rights he
may have." Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1. 8 (1956).
120 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978).
121 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
122 Id. at 91.
123 A prophylactic rule might be constitutionally compelled when it is necessary to
overprotect a constitutional right because a narrow, theoretically more dis-
criminating rule may not work in practice. This may happen where, for exam-
ple, there is a substantial danger that a more finely tuned rule may be sub-
verted in its administration by unsympathetic courts, juries or public officials.
Monaghan, supra note 109, at 21. Professor Monaghan offers as an example New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), where "[a]n absolute privilege might be jus-
tified on the ground that any lesser protection would prove insufficient when administered
by unsympathetic juries." Monaghan, supra note 109, at 21-22 n. 113.
The Court apparently overprotected the right to counsel by requiring automatic rever-
sal in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). In Herring, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a statute that permitted a judge to dispense with summation arguments in nonjury
cases. The right to counsel, however, should not constitutionally mandate that a judge
permit summation arguments in all criminal cases. Even in jury cases, judges can exercise
broad discretion to limit the scope of a defense attorney's closing arguments. See, e.g.,
United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1978). Indeed, the refusal to permit summa-
tions appears to implicate questions of procedural due process rather than the right to
counsel. The Herring dissent argued:
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The Court has not defined rules of equivalence for late ap-
pointment of counsel claims.1 24  Constitutionally, the minimum
requirement for effective assistance is that the appointment of
counsel permit a reasonable time for trial preparation. But to
avoid a case-by-case examination of circumstantial prejudice, the
methodology of ordinary due process, courts must define reason-
ableness substantively. For this reason, the Supreme Court should
formulate constitutional common law rules for measuring late ap-
pointments. For example, the Court might impose specific time
requirements according to offense classifications.125  An accused
[B]eyond certain of the specified rights in the Bill of Rights, however, I do not
understand the basis for abandoning the case-by-case approach to fundamental
fairness ....
... The truth of the matter is that appellant received a fair trial, and I do
not read the Court's opinion to claim otherwise. The opinion instead establishes
a right to summation in criminal trials regardless of circumstances, by tagging
that right onto one of the specifically incorporated rights. It thereby conve-
niently avoids the difficulties of being unable to characterize appellant's trial as
fundamentally unfair, but only at the expense of ignoring the logical difficulty
of adorning the specifically incorporated rights with characteristics which are
not themselves necessary for fundamental fairness.
Id. at 868, 871 (dissenting opinion, Rehnquist, J.).
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), the Supreme Court decided an analo-
gous issue on grounds of procedural due process. In Brooks, the Court reviewed the con-
stitutionality of a state statute requiring an accused who wishes to testify to take the stand
immediately after the close of the prosecution's case. The Court stated that this rule im-
permissibly deprived the accused of the "'guiding hand of counsel' in the timing of this
critical element of the defense." Id. at 612-13 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69
(1932)). It concluded that "the accused and his counsel may not be restricted in deciding
whether, and when in the course of presenting his defense, the accused should take the
stand." Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. at 613. Unlike Herring, Brooks did not link this
infraction directly to the sixth amendment right to counsel. Rather, it held that the statute
denied the defendant due process. Id. at 612. This may explain why Brooks, unlike Herring,
implied that it could have been appropriate to consider the harmlessness of the error, had
the state raised that issue. Id. at 613.
124 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), is the only post-Gideon case on point. See
note 43 supra. But in Chambers, the court did not reach the equivalence issue. The Third
Circuit had applied a presumption-of-prejudice rule to determine that a late appointment
of counsel had denied the defendant effective aid. The Court also had held tliat the inef-
fectiveness was harmless error. United States ex rel. Chambers v. Maroney, 408 F.2d 1186,
1189-90 (3d Cir. 1969). By affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court merely indicated
that harmless error is appropriate in some ineffectiveness cases.
'25 The Supreme Court might also permit state courts to create their own rules to gov-
ern late appointment cases. Monaghan, supra note 109, at 37-38. The Court has the power
to reject state law in view of its special competence in interpreting the Constitution and the
need for a uniform national law of civil liberties. Id. at 38. See also United States ex reL
Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312, 1315-17 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (discussing need for
specific rules to determine speedy trial violations).
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would prove ineffectiveness by showing a violation of one of these
rules.1 26  The rules would not be "necessary dimensions of an
underlying Constitutional right," 127 but would "rest upon debata-
ble policy choices or uncertain empirical foundations." 128 There-
fore, they would form constitutional law.
The same approach would apply to effective performance
cases. In McMann v. Richardson,129 the Court determined that
when an accused pleads guilty to a criminal charge on advice of
counsel, he acts knowingly only if that advice is "within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 130 Cer-
tainly the Supreme Court intended to offer as much protection to
those who plead innocent as to those who plead guilty. Accord-
ingly, the minimum constitutional requirement for effective assist-
ance is that the attorney's performance fall "within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 131 As with
the reasonableness standard of the late appointment cases, a com-
petence standard will duplicate due process methodology unless
the Court identifies objective duties of competent behavior.
32
Such standards would implement the underlying guarantee of ef-
fective aid, and like the rules that protect an accused from late
appointment of counsel, would be constitutional common law.1 33
126 A difficult problem arises when an accused alleges that the appointment was ineffec-
tive as applied to him. Consider, for example, a rule requiring the court to appoint counsel
not less than one week before trial in all second-degree manslaughter cases. Assume also
that an appointment is made seven days in advance of trial. Upon conviction, may the
accused appeal, claiming that his case was extraordinarily complicated and that seven days
was an unreasonably short amount of time for attorney preparation? To permit such a
challenge would strip the rule of its utility. But other paths exist. The appellant might
demonstrate that the rule is unreasonable on its face. He also might demonstrate that as
applied, the "late appointment" rule denied him his right to fundamental fairness (due
process). This would require a demonstration of prejudice.
127 Monaghan, supra note 109, at 22.-
328 Id. at 34.
129 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
130 Id. at 771.
131 For a discussion of the use of McMann by circuit courts, see note 34 supra.
132 For examples of these standard duties, see note 98 supra.
133 By defining these rules as constitutional common law, the Court would avoid the
problems that result from formulating rigid constitutional rules and remedies:
So long as the rules are thought to be constitutional in character, however,
pressures for change can be accommodated only through an express overruling
of prior doctrine, or the whittling away of an original holding through spurious
"distinctions" or through such devices as doctrines of waiver, standing and
harmless error.
Monaghan, supra note 109, at 27. Unlike true constitutional rules, constitutional common
law may be altered by congressional act. See generally id. Consider the analogous involve-
ment of Congress in providing pre-trial investigation funds for the indigent. 18 U.S.C.
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The rules discussed above, both constitutional and constitu-
tional common law, define effective assistance of counsel without
reference to prejudice. For this reason, incorporation can be re-
jected as an unnecessary and undesirable distortion of sixth
amendment law. This theory, however, must still explain why the
Supreme Court has used a harmless error analysis in some inef-
fective assistance situations.
1 3 4
Chapman v. California 135 defines the contours of "harmless-
constitutional-error." Chapman acknowledged that "there may be
some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case
are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent
with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring
the automatic reversal of the conviction." 136 The Court created a
special constitutional harmless error rule for such cases by requir-
ing that the beneficiary of the error prove harmlessness beyond a
reasonable doubt.
1 37
Chapman also declared that "some constitutional rights [are] so
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error," 138 but failed to explain when this more stringent
standard of review would apply.1 39  Significantly, the Court sup-
ported this proposition by citing Gideon,140 suggesting that a de-
§ 3006A(e) (1976). Although this act applies only to federal courts, one circuit has recog-
nized its underlying constitutional basis, and by analogy, has used it to review a state court
conviction. Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351-55 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S.
936 (1975).
134 See note 124 supra.
13r, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
,31 Id. at 22.
,31 Id. at 24.
138 Id. at 23.
,39 In Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the Court offered an explanation for
its refusal to use harmless error:
In the normal case where a harmless-error rule is applied, the error occurs at
trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can
undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the
likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the
jury.... But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it
bears repeating - is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations
and in the sentencing process .... Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless
error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.
Id. at 490-91 (emphasis in original). Thus, despite the language of Chapman, the Court in
Holloway focused on the measurability of the prejudice, rather than the nature of the right.
141 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967). See also Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) ("The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising
from its denial.")
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nial of the assistance of counsel is never harmless. 4' Similarly,
courts should never apply harmless error when ineffective assist-
ance is equivalent to a violation of the underlying constitutional
right. 142  By determining whether a ruling is constitutional or
constitutional common law, one can also determine whether
harmless error analysis is permissible.
This explains why the Court refused to apply harmless error
in Holloway 143 and Geders.144  In both cases, constitutional rules of
equivalence were violated. Accordingly, harmless error could not
be applied without contradicting Chapman. This analysis also ex-
plains why courts may use harmless error in late appointment
145
and inadequate performance of counsel cases. 146  Rules that mea-
sure ineffectiveness for these cases advance important policies, but
do not define constitutional equivalence. They merely create "a
subconstitutional penumbral area formed by emanations" from
the constitutional right.147  Therefore, no constitutional conflict
" See 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (CRIMINAL) § 855 (1969);
Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error. The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L.
REV. 519, 541 (1969).
'42 Compare Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) ("Harmless error
tests do not apply in regard to the deprivation of a procedural right so fundamental as the
effective assistance of counsel") with McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 218 (8th Cir.
1974) (permitting harmless error analysis when counsel ineffective, but not when assistance
completely absent).
141 See notes 115-17 and accompanying text supra.
'44 See notes 121-23 and accompanying text supra.
M See notes 125-28 and accompanying text supra.
146 See notes 129-32 and accompanying text supra.
4 Monaghan, supra note 109, at 18 n.98. This distinction also explains the Supreme
Court's use of harmless error in pretrial right to counsel cases. See Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1970); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967). In Wade, the court stated that "the accused is guaranteed that he need not
stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court
or out, where counsel's absence. might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial." Id.
at 226. Although the accused in Wade was impermissibly denied counsel at a critical stage
of the pretrial proceeding, the court did not apply automatic reversal. Rather, it remanded
the case to determine if the error was harmless. See also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. at
11, and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. at 272 (remanding cases to determine whether de-
nial of counsel at pretrial proceeding was harmless error). The Court's actions are
explained by recognizing that the right to counsel in pretrial proceedings is an example of
constitutional common law. "This extension of the right to counsel to events before trial
has resulted from changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation that have
tended to generate pretrial events that might appropriately be considered to be parts of
the trial itself." United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973). Thus, this expansion rests
upon "debatable policy choices" and "uncertain empirical foundations" - a constitutional
common law.
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This Note has examined an important aspect of the right to
effective assistance of counsel-the debate between incor-
porationist and nonincorporationist methodologies. The Note
demonstrates that ineffective representation is a constitutional
violation when it is equivalent to a denial of the "Assistance of
Counsel." Equivalence is measured by either constitutional or
subconstitutional rules. When the accused demonstrates that a
constitutional rule is violated, reversal is automatic. When he
proves a violation of a constitutional common law rule, the convic-
tion will stand only if the government can prove harmless error.
In both situations, incorporation is unwarranted.
Philip H. Newman
148 Some may argue that because incompetent representation is inherently prejudicial,
harmless error is inappropriate. See note 139 supra. But harmless error is necessary to
avoid a greater injustice- incorporation. For example, assume that an attorney has failed
to consult with his client more than once before trial. On its face, this appears to violate his
duty "to keep his client informed of the developments in the case and the progress of
preparing the defense." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 97 at § 3.8. Following conviction, the
accused alleges that because of the attorney's breach of duty, he has been denied effective
assistance of counsel. To evaluate this claim, a court must first consider whether the attor-
ney substantially breached his duty to consult. The unreasonableness of the attorney's con-
duct is closely related to the likelihood that his conduct actually harmed the accused. If
harmless error is not permitted, then a court will be compelled to consider the case-by-case
circumstances to determine if prejudice resulted. As a practical matter, harmless error
permits a court to defer judgment on this issue. Instead, it may rely on more general
considerations of reasonable behavior, that is, whether the "reasonably competent criminal
attorney" would consult more frequently with his client in this type of case (rather than this
particular case). After determining that he would, the court then would permit the gov-
ernment to prove that in this particular case, the breach was harmless. If not for the
availability of harmless error, the court would examine prejudice when initially examining
the alleged breach. This would defeat the purpose of creating standards of attorney per-
formance, and would convert the sixth amendment claim into a procedural due process
claim.
